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Abstract—We propose to apply deep transfer learning from
computer vision to static malware classification. In the transfer
learning scheme, we borrow knowledge from natural images
or objects and apply to the target domain of static malware
detection. As a result, training time of deep neural networks
is accelerated while high classification performance is still main-
tained. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on three
experiments and show that our proposed method outperforms
other classical machine learning methods measured in accuracy,
false positive rate, true positive rate and F1 score (in binary
classification). We instrument an interpretation component to
the algorithm and provide interpretable explanations to enhance
security practitioners’ trust to the model. We further discuss a
convex combination scheme of transfer learning and training
from scratch for enhanced malware detection, and provide
insights of the algorithmic interpretation of vision-based malware
classification techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware is a type of software that possesses malicious
characteristics to cause damage to the user, computer or
network. Categories of malware include virus, trojan horses,
worms, spyware, ransomware and so on. Static analysis is
a quick and straightforward way to detect malware without
executing the application or monitoring the run time behav-
ior. One main technique is the so-called signature matching,
where the goal is to search whether the strings in the code
actually match any identified malicious patterns in database.
However when the code is obfuscated or morphed, signature
matching cannot be applied and becomes less resilient to detect
malicious patterns. Moreover the rapid increase of signatures,
often in exponential growth, makes the signature matching less
efficient and scalable.
Machine learning, as a probabilistic way, has demonstrated
to be quite powerful for large-scale malware detection. One
key ingredient for a successful machine learning malware
detector is feature engineering. For static analysis, often a
disassembly step is done on the application binary, so the code
becomes human-readable. What follows is heavy emphasis on
excellent feature construction including binning the type of
function calls, counting the number of loops, and applying
language models on the PE headers. Such feature processing
can result in very high dimensional feature space. For such
high-dimensional dataset, dimension reduction or feature se-
lection are used, but the number of dimensions to select or
the procedure of feature selection is generally a challenging
problem in both practical and theoretical machine learning [1],
[2]. Hence an automated and effective method without much
manual efforts of feature construction is greatly desired.
In this paper, we propose an enhanced malware detection
framework employing deep transfer learning to train directly
on malware images. Our approach is motivated by visual
inspection of application binaries plotted as grey-scale images:
there exists textural and structural similarities among malware
from the same family and dissimilarities between malware and
benignware as well as across different malware families. This
observation is also seen in [3], [4], [5].
Naturally we consider malware classification as a computer
vision problem. Our proposed method is able to consume the
entire application binary with or without code obfuscation and
independent of signatures. Further, it does not require manual
feature engineering or extraction effort.
The step of transfer learning step is employed to borrow
source knowledge from large scale of natural images or objects
and applied on the target task of malware detection. Compared
to existing vision-based malware classification approaches [5],
[6], [3], [7], the transfer learning scheme greatly accelerates
the training of very deep neural networks while maintaining
high classification performance even on smaller sized dataset.
In our experiments, we show that our method obtains
the highest classification accuracy, lowest false positive rate,
highest true positive rate and highest F1 score compared to
classical machine learning algorithms such as shallow neural
networks, naive Bayes [8], k-nearest neighbor [9], linear
discriminant analysis[10], random forest[11], XGB[12], and
support vector machine [13] with linear and radial kernels
respectively. Furthermore, we compared transfer learning with
training from scratch and demonstrate the advantage of using
transfer learning on limited amount of dataset to achieve
superior performance.
Despite the classification effectiveness of our proposed
method, understanding the reason why the deep transfer learn-
ing model makes such predictions on the malware images is
critical for security researchers and practitioners. The inter-
pretations will generate valuable insights to triage malware
families and enhance the practitioners’ trust to the model.
Hence an effective model for deployment not only has the
best classification performance but also provides explainable
interpretation for its predictions. Our proposed method ad-
dresses the model interpretability and trustworthiness aspect
via utilizing the local-interpretable model-agnostic explanation
approach [14]. We illustrate in Section IV using the image-
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based deep learning classifier for intelligent interpretability.
Such interpretability again highlights the advantage of deep
transfer learning classification on malware image classifica-
tion, so that the algorithm is no longer black-box.
The contributions of our paper are summarized as below:
• We propose using transfer learning from computer vision
to apply for static malware classification. The transfer
learning scheme greatly accelerates training deep neural
networks while maintaining high classification perfor-
mance.
• We thoroughly examine and evaluate the effectiveness
of the proposed method in real-world experiments. Our
method achieves the best accuracy at 99.25%, 98.13%
and 99.67% respectively in three datasets, compared with
training from scratch scheme and classical but effective
machine learning algorithms. When evaluated in false
positive rate, true positive rate and F1 score, our method
also outperforms other algorithms in consideration.
• We provide interpretable explanations of the deep transfer
learning for malware image classification. The interpreta-
tion component of our approach adds trust to the model
and becomes essential for security practitioners to put
faith for model deployment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides background on image-based malware classification
approaches. Section III presents our proposed methodology
in detail. Section IV applies our method on real datasets and
demonstrates its superior performance compared with classical
but effective machine learning classifiers as well as training
from scratch. We also illustrate how to generate reasonable and
interpretable explanations of our approach to better understand
the model prediction and enhance trust in the model. Section V
summarizes the paper and discusses future research directions.
II. RELATED WORK
For static malware classification, signature matching is
effective at identifying known malware, but new or morphed
malware code not present in the signature database can easily
evade detection. Machine learning based malware detection
provides an automatic and probabilistic way to detect malware.
Particularly these models extend the effectiveness to detect
malware with great scalability and efficiency.
Classification on image-based malware data has shown to
be very promising. Authors in [5] were the first to propose
converting malware binaries into digital grey-scale images.
They applied GIST feature extraction on the malware images
followed by k-nearest neighbor with Euclidean distance and
achieved 98% classification accuracy on a malware benchmark
consisting of 25 malware families. We use the same dataset for
our experiment in Section IV and demonstrate our proposed
method has higher classification accuracy. In [3], the authors
proposed using artificial neural network to perform malware
classification. They apply wavelet transformation for feature
extraction and then train support vector machine and artificial
neural network on the extracted features. In [15], the author
proposed to use convolutional neural network for multi-family
malware classification. In [7], the authors proposed to use
malware images for IoT malware classification. In [16], the
authors proposed a hierarchical ensemble neural network on
Intel R© Processor Trace for effective exploit detection. The
collected trace is converted into time series of images and
deep convolutional neural network is trained on the images
representing the dynamic behaviors of the malware.
III. METHODOLOGY
The motivation of our approach comes from visual in-
spection of the malware binaries represented as grey-scale
images and observe that the malware from the same fam-
ily share structural similarities and malware from different
families show distinct structural or textural information. Such
visual inspection provides foundation for treating the malware
classification problem as a vision classification task.
Deep learning has demonstrated state-of-the-art perfor-
mance on large-scale image classification. Particularly, transfer
learning has heavily been employed in computer vision. The
idea of transfer learning is to borrow the knowledge learned
from a model used in one domain and apply it to another
targeted domain. Typically practitioners would take a pre-
trained model from a type of image dataset, freeze a portion
of the layers and fine-tune the last few layers on the newly
obtained dataset. The advantages of transfer learning include
accelerating training time, reducing parameters and architec-
ture search for deep neural networks and maintaining high
classification performance especially on relatively smaller-
sized dataset.
Our proposed method leverages the value of transfer learn-
ing to train a highly effective malware classifier for static
malware classification. Essentially our methods consists of
four main steps: reshaping, resizing and replicating as pre-
processing, training deep neural network via transfer learning,
evaluation and interpretation. The preprocessing step directly
converts the raw binary into two-dimensional images with
minimum feature engineering. Subsequently transfer learning
in computer vision are applied on the malware images. The
interpretation component offers explainability on predictions
and thus helps the security practitioners trust the model for
deployment. We describe our steps in detail below. Figure 1
is an overview of our proposed framework.
A. Preprocessing
Given a static binary, we map it directly to an array of
integers between 0 and 255. Hence each binary is converted
into a one-dimensional array v ∈ [0, 255]. Then the array v is
normalized to [0, 1] by dividing by 255.
The normalized array v is then reshaped into a two-
dimensional array v′, as seen in Table I. We follow the resizing
as in [5] where the width is determined with respect to the
file size. The height of the file is the total length of the one-
dimensional array divided by the width. We round up the
height and pad zeros if the width is not divisible by the file
size.
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Figure 1. An overview of our proposed method, which utilizes transfer learning on malware images and provides visually explainable interpretation.
File size (kb) Width
(0, 10] 32 or remove samples
(10, 30] 64
(30, 60] 128
(60, 100] 256
(100, 200] 384
(200, 500] 512
(500, 1000] 768
(1000, 2000] 1024
> 200 2048
Table I
WE RESHAPE THE ONE-DIMENSIONAL ARRAY v INTO TWO-DIMENSIONAL
ARRAY v′ USING THE ABOVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FILE SIZE AND
WIDTH.
We resize the grey scale images into m by m matrix.
The choice of m is typically 224 or 229 to fit the input
size of the pre-trained models via ImageNet. After resizing
the two-dimensional arrays into squared gray-scale images,
we replicate the channel three times to convert it into RGB
images.
B. Training
The second step is to conduct transfer learning on the
reshaped and resized images, where a portion of the layers
are frozen and the last few layers are retrained on the malware
images. Because of the transfer learning scheme, our frame-
work is flexible to support a variety of deep learning neural
networks such as Inception [17], [18], VGG [19], ResNet [20],
DenseNet [21]. Using transfer learning, we save significant
amount of time searching for the neural network architectures,
parameters and optimizers.
Given the same data representation as RGB images and the
same amount of least feature engineering efforts, our proposed
approach outperforms popular malware classifiers such as shal-
low neural networks, naive Bayes [8], k-nearest neighbor [9],
linear discriminant analysis[10], random forest[11], XGB[12],
and support vector machine [13] with linear and radial kernels
respectively. Additionally, we compared transfer learning with
training from scratch. Since we have much fewer malware
images as opposed the size of ImageNet [22], training from
scratch on the large deep neural networks may not converge.
Thus for training from scratch, we use the small versions of
the deep neural networks for comparison. On the other hand,
this emphasizes the advantage of using transfer learning when
data size or amount is limited.
C. Evaluation
We use classification accuracy, false positive rate, true
positive rate, F1 score (in binary classification) as evaluation
metrics for our proposed methodology. We will show in
Section IV that our proposed method outperforms all other
selected machine learning algorithms in terms of all these
metrics on real-world datasets.
D. Interpretation
While classification performance is one key metric for
model selection in malware classification, solely relying on
classification power without explainablity or interpretation
puts blind trust on the model, and that model may not even
perform well in the wild. Especially for security researchers
and practitioners, in addition to highly accurate predictions,
they must be able to understand why the model makes such
predictions and interpret the explanations as faithful and
intelligent in order to trust the model.
To provide interpretation, we essentially follow the local-
interpretable model-agnostic explanation algorithm in [14]. We
first represent the malware images via super pixels, which
are regions or patches of pixels adjacent to each other. The
super-pixel representation becomes an visually interpretable
feature on the malware images. Then a binary vector of {0,
1}-values is imposed on each super pixel, where 0 indicates
the absence of the super pixel and 1 indicates the presence
of the super pixel. We use sparse linear classifiers to train
on the binary vectors and obtain the trained coefficients. The
positive coefficients associated with each super pixel means the
regions of pixels are contributing to the classification decision
by the model. The negative coefficients associated with the
super pixels mean these regions in the malware image do
not contribute to the classification decision. We will illustrate
in Section IV how to use this interpretation component to
understand the prediction reason. Security practitioners can
identify the locations of interest generated by the interpretation
and refer back to the binary file to identify new patterns or
signatures.
3
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we apply our proposed method on three real
datasets and demonstrate our proposed method achieves supe-
rior classification performance. For all the experiments, we use
the pre-trained Inception-V1 on ImageNet at 126-th epoch for
transfer learning, where we freeze all the layers before the last
pooling layer and retrain the fully connected layer using the
malware datasets. We compare Inception transfer learning with
training from scratch using the small Inception neural network.
The classical machine learning algorithms used for comparison
are shallow fully connected neural networks (shallow NN),
naive Bayes, 5-nearest neighbor (5NN), linear discriminant
analysis (LDA), random forest, XGB, support vector machine
with linear kernel (SVM-linear), support vector machine with
radial kernel (SVM-radial), all of which are applied on the
pixel representation of the malware images for fair compar-
ison. We consider both array-based and vectorization-based
representation of the malware image datasets.
Experiment I and II are multi-family malware classification,
where we will report the classification accuracy, average false
positive rate and average true positive rate as the metrics for
comparing the effectiveness of the classifiers. The average
false positive rate is defined as
FPR :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
fpri, (1)
where n is the total number of malware families and fpri
denotes the false positive rate for the sample from any other
malware family being misclassified as from the i-th malware
family. Similarly, the average true positive rate is defined as
TPR :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
tpri, (2)
where n is the total number of malware families and tpri
denotes the true positive rate for the sample from i-th malware
family being correctly classified as from the i-th malware
family. Experiment III is a binary-class classification problem
on benign and malware samples, where we will report the
accuracy, false positive rate, true positive rate and F1-score
on test set for algorithm comparison.
A. Multi-family malware classification I
We evaluate our method on a benchmark malware dataset
used in [5], [4], [6], [15]. There are 9458 malware
samples from 25 malware families: Allaple.L, Allaple.A,
Yuner.A, Lolyda.AA 1, Lolyda.AA 2, Lolyda.AA 3, C2Lop.P,
C2Lop.gen!g, Instantaccess, Swizzot.gen!I, Swizzot.gen!E,
VB.AT, Fakerean, Alueron.gen!J, Malex.gen!J, Lolyda.AT,
Adialer.C, Wintrim.BX, Dialplatform.B, Dontovo.A, Obfusca-
tor.AD, Agent.FYI, Autorun.K, Rbot!gen, Skintrim.N. We ran-
domly split the training:valiation:testing ratio to be 0.8:0.1:0.1.
We first resize the malware images into 224× 224 grey-scale
images and then replicate the channel three times so the images
are RGB of size 224× 224× 3.
Figure 2. The training and validation accuracy of our method over 25 epochs
for multi-family malware classification. To avoid overfitting, we use the model
at the 14-th epoch for prediction on test set.
We train the last fully connected layer of the network for 25
epochs and plot the training and validation accuracy in Figure
2. Due to the bias-variance trade-off[23], we select the model
trained at the 14-th epoch and apply it on the test data. On the
test set, the classification accuracy by our proposed method is
99.25% with average false positive rate at 0.030% and average
true positive rate at 98.15% respectively. These three metrics
outperform all the other 17 classifiers as shown in Table II.
The confusion matrix is plotted in Figure 3.
When applying the selected classical machine learning algo-
rithms on images of 224 × 224, the dimension is 50176, which
is much greater than 7481 the number of training samples. Due
to the curse of dimensionality [23], we first apply principal
component analysis (PCA) on the training set and select the
first 100 Principal Component (PC) dimensions based on the
scree plot. Then PCA rotation is applied on the test matrix
to obtain the low-rank representation. XGB performs the best
second after our method with accuracy of 98.44%, average
FPR at 0.065% and average TPR at 95.97%, while naive Bayes
performs the worst with accuracy of 88.05%, average FPR at
0.501% and average TPR at 88.84%.
Training from scratch is done using small Inception neural
network where the images are resized to 28 by 28 with
single channel, since we do not have enough large dataset to
enable training from scratch for large networks. The resulted
accuracy, average FPR and average TPR are 95.28%, 0.211%
and 87.68% respectively, which are less effective compared
to our method. This could be due to information loss from
resizing. We also apply the selected classical algorithms on
the images vectorized into one-dimensional arrays of length
784. Random forest and XGB have competitive performance
as training from scratch. Surprisingly, the performance of
5NN degrades significantly. Resizing and L2 distance could
be contributing to the degradation.
We note the performance of the other classifiers in compar-
ison might improve if we construct features rather than image
representation. However this again highlights the advantage of
deep learning of saving cost at feature engineering.
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Algorithm Accuracy FPR TPR Data shape
Our method 99.25% 0.030% 98.15% 224× 224× 3
TFS via shallow NN ◦ PCA 97.14% 0.120% 91.78% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
Naive Bayes◦ PCA 88.05% 0.501% 88.84% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
5-nearest neighbor◦ PCA 97.90% 0.087% 94.79% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
LDA ◦ PCA 92.51% 0.334% 83.18% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
Random forest◦ PCA 98.12% 0.078% 95.14% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
XGB ◦ PCA 98.44% 0.065% 95.97% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
SVM-linear◦ PCA 97.74% 0.095% 94.30% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
SVM-radial◦ PCA 95.69% 0.179% 90.02% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
TFS via Small Inception 95.28% 0.211% 87.68% 28× 28× 1
TFS via shallow NN 93.00% 0.303% 81.91% 28× 28× 1→ 784
Naive Bayes 94.02% 0.249% 85.65% 28× 28× 1→ 784
5-nearest neighbor 44.40% 2.257% 56.37% 28× 28× 1→ 784
LDA ◦ PCA 91.07% 0.384% 78.71% 28× 28× 1→ 784→ 50
Random forest 95.53% 0.199% 85.71% 28× 28× 1→ 784
XGB 95.37% 0.192% 86.37% 28× 28× 1→ 784
SVM-linear 92.14% 0.379% 78.12% 28× 28× 1→ 784
SVM-radial 92.25% 0.374% 78.36% 28× 28× 1→ 784
Table II
COMPARISON OF ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE ON DATASET I. OUR PROPOSED METHOD ACHIEVES THE HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY, HIGHEST
AVERAGE TRUE POSITIVE RATE AND LOWEST FALSE POSITIVE RATE.
Figure 3. The confusion matrix of our proposed method on the test set. The
classification accuracy by our proposed method is 99.25% with average false
positive rate at 0.030% and average true positive rate at 98.15% respectively.
B. Multi-family malware classification II
The Microsoft Malware Dataset[24] was a dataset used
in the Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge in 2015.
This dataset is almost half a terabyte when uncompressed and
has become a standard benchmark for malware classification
research. There are 10868 malware samples from nine mal-
ware families: Ramnit, Lollipop, Kelihos ver3, Vundo, Simda,
Tracur, Kelihos ver1, Obfuscator.ACY and Gatak.
The raw data contains each file’s binary content without the
header. Following Section III, we first reshape the binary into
images, then resize the two-dimensional arrays into size of 224
by 224, and duplicate the grey scale three times to convert into
three channels finally. Our training : validation : test ratio is
set at 0.8:0.1:0.1.
We train the network for 25 epochs and plot the training
and validation accuracy in Figure 4. Due to the bias-variance
trade off[23], we select the model trained at the 13-th epoch
and apply it on the test data. On the test set, the classification
accuracy by our proposed method is 98.13% with average
false positive rate at 0.237% and average true positive rate
at 96.63% respectively. These three metrics outperform all the
other 17 classifiers as shown in Table III. The confusion matrix
is plotted in Figure 5.
The vectorized dimension of images ∈ [0, 1]224×224 is
50176, which is much greater than the number of training
samples. Due to the curse of dimensionality [23], we first apply
PCA on the training set and select the first 80 PC dimensions
by the scree plot. Then the PCA rotation is applied on the
test matrix to obtain the low-rank representation. Again, XGB
performs the best second after our method with accuracy of
96.01%, average FPR at 0.514% and average TPR at 85.80%,
while LDA performs the worst with accuracy of 76.45%,
average FPR at 3.023% and average TPR at 63.86%.
Training from scratch is done using small Inception neural
network where the images are resized to 28 by 28 with single
channel, since we do not have enough large dataset to enable
training from scratch using the original inception network
architecture. The resulted accuracy, average FPR and average
TPR are 94.57%, 0.683% and 89.02% respectively, which are
less effective compared to our method. We also apply the
selected classical algorithms on the images vectorized into
one-dimensional arrays of length 784. SVM-linear and SVM-
radial have similar performance but less effective compared
with training from scratch.
C. Binary Classification
Our third experiment is a binary classification to distinguish
benignware and malware. After calculating the size distribu-
tion, we remove the benign files under 5kb, since the patterns
in the image are greatly distorted after resizing as seen in
Figure 6. After removal, the dataset consists of 16518 benign
files and 10639 malicious files.
We fine-tune the network for 25 epochs and plot the training
and validation accuracy in Figure 7. We select the model
trained at the 14-th epoch and apply it on the test data. On the
test set, the classification accuracy by our proposed method is
99.67% with false positive rate at 0.750%, true positive rate
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Algorithm Accuracy FPR TPR Data shape
Our method 98.13% 0.237% 96.63% 224× 224× 3
TFS via shallow NN ◦ PCA 82.41% 2.551% 59.38% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 80
Naive Bayes◦ PCA 74.23% 3.116% 73.06% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 80
5-nearest neighbor◦ PCA 95.31% 0.602% 85.75% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 80
LDA ◦ PCA 76.45% 3.023% 63.86% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 80
Random forest◦ PCA 95.73% 0.548% 84.26% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 80
XGB ◦ PCA 96.01% 0.514% 85.80% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 80
SVM-linear◦ PCA 86.35% 1.799% 72.71% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 80
SVM-radial◦ PCA 86.26% 1.975% 72.14% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 80
TFS via Small Inception 94.57% 0.683% 89.02% 28× 28× 1
TFS via shallow NN 82.32% 2.382% 67.01% 28× 28× 1→ 784
Naive Bayes 72.09% 3.563% 62.93% 28× 28× 1→ 784
5-nearest neighbor 72.51% 3.879% 55.89% 28× 28× 1→ 784
LDA ◦ PCA 72.37% 3.609% 59.72% 28× 28× 1→ 784
Random forest 86.35% 1.845% 73.05% 28× 28× 1→ 784
XGB 90.15% 1.299% 79.00% 28× 28× 1→ 784
SVM-linear 92.14% 0.379% 78.12% 28× 28× 1→ 784
SVM-radial 92.25% 0.374% 78.36% 28× 28× 1→ 784
Table III
COMPARISON OF ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE ON DATASET II. AGAIN, OUR PROPOSED METHOD ACHIEVES THE HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY,
HIGHEST AVERAGE TRUE POSITIVE RATE AND LOWEST FALSE POSITIVE RATE.
Figure 4. The training and validation accuracy of our method over 30 epochs
for multi-family malware classification. Due to bias-variance trade off, we
select the model trained at the 13-th epoch and apply it on the test data.
Figure 5. The confusion matrix of our method on test set. The accuracy,
average false positive rate and average true positive rate are 98.13%, 0.237%
, and 96.63% respectively, outperforming all other selected methods.
Figure 6. We remove files with size less than 5 kb, since after reshaping, the
patterns are greatly distorted.
Figure 7. The training and validation accuracy of our method during 25
epochs for binary classification. To avoid overfitting, we use the model at the
14-th epoch for testing.
at 99.94% and F1 score at 99.73% respectively. Evaluated in
all the four metrics, our method outperforms all the other 17
classifiers as shown in Table IV. The ROC curve, with area
under the curve being 1, and the confusion matrix are plotted
in Figure 8. At accuracy of 98.03%, the false positive rate is
0.
In summary, all three experiments demonstrate the classifi-
cation efficacy of our proposed methodology superior to the
selected classical machine learning algorithms and training
from scratch.
D. Prediction interpretation
Simply trusting the best performing classifier is equivalent
to putting blind faith in the black-box ML models. Our
proposed approach addresses the trustworthy issue of deep
transfer learning for image-based malware classification. Here
we illustrate via one prediction how interpretation can be
generated and can be helpful for malware practitioners to
triage malware or discover new signatures.
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Algorithm Accuracy FPR TPR F1 Data shape
Our method 99.67% 0.750% 99.94% 99.73% 224× 224× 3
TFS via shallow NN ◦ PCA 63.59% 92.95% 100.0% 76.96% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 80
Naive Bayes◦ PCA 48.82% 6.770% 20.22% 32.47% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 80
5-nearest neighbor◦ PCA 98.16% 2.962% 98.88% 98.49% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
LDA ◦ PCA 87.70% 23.60% 94.97% 90.38% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
Random forest◦ PCA 98.05% 3.150% 98.82% 98.40% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
XGB ◦ PCA 98.16% 2.774% 98.76% 98.49% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
SVM-linear◦ PCA 90.83% 15.70% 95.03% 92.65% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
SVM-radial◦ PCA 97.11 % 6.91% 99.70 % 97.67% 224× 224× 1→ 50176→ 100
TFS via Small Inception 98.42% 2.158% 98.79% 98.70% 28× 28× 1
TFS via shallow NN 93.11% 7.475% 93.49% 94.29% 28× 28× 1→ 784
Naive Bayes 79.83% 35.87% 89.95% 84.44% 28× 28× 1→ 784
5-nearest neighbor 80.52% 12.60% 76.08% 82.61% 28× 28× 1→ 784
LDA ◦ PCA 85.64% 29.71% 95.52% 89.00% 28× 28× 1→ 784→ 50
Random forest 92.78% 17.44% 99.36% 94.36% 28× 28× 1→ 784
XGB 94.92% 9.450% 97.73% 95.90% 28× 28× 1→ 784
SVM-linear 84.48 % 25.06% 90.61% 87.66% 28× 28× 1→ 784
SVM-radial 93.26% 14.06% 97.97% 94.65% 28× 28× 1→ 784
Table IV
COMPARISON OF ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE ON DATASET III. OUR PROPOSED METHOD ACHIEVES THE HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY,
HIGHEST AVERAGE TRUE POSITIVE RATE, LOWEST FALSE POSITIVE RATE AND HIGHEST F1 SCORE.
Figure 8. Top: The ROC curve of applying our method to the benign-ware and
malware test set. The area under the curve is 1. At accuracy of 98.03%, the
false positive rate is 0. Bottom: The confusion matrix of applying our method
to the benign-ware and malware test set. The accuracy is 99.67% with 0.75%
false positive rate, 99.94% true positive rate and 99.73% F1 score.
We select a malware image from malware family
Lloyda.AA2 and plot 200 super-pixel representations in Figure
9. Each super pixel is associated with a feature value of 0
indicating absence and 1 otherwise. We examine what aspects
of the malware image are considered by the model to produce
the prediction and plot the top 5 classes predicted by the
model as seen in Figure 10. The top 1 predicted class is
Lolyda.AA2 with prediction probability above 99.9%. In the
far left plot in Figure 10, the green regions indicate the pixel
regions where the model believes they are contributing to the
Figure 9. The malware image is represented as 200 super pixels with
boundaries drawn in red.
prediction decision as Lolyda.AA2. The red regions indicate
the pixel regions where the model does not believe they
contribute to the prediction. Most area are plotted as green. On
the other hand, the top 5-th prediction is Lolyda.AA3, where
most of the regions are red, indicating the model sees the
least of Lolyda.AA3 family in this malware image. Security
practitioners can use such visual explanation and interpretation
to identify new malware patterns and boost trust in deep
learning models for image-based malware classification.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this work we propose using transfer learning from
computer vision for static malware classification. Via three
datasets, we demonstrated the superior performance of the
proposed technique in comparison with training from scratch
and other classical machine learning algorithms. We discuss
our future research agenda.
A. Convex Combination for Enhanced Malware Classification
Unlike transfer learning which only fine-tunes a small
portion of layers in a deep neural network, training from
scratch convey information from the malware images within
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Figure 10. Visual interpretation of what the algorithm sees. The red regions
indicate the pixel regions which the model does not believe they contribute
to the prediction. Most area are plotted as green. On the other hand, the top
5-th prediction is Lolyda.AA3, and most of the regions are red, indicating the
model sees the least of Lolyda.AA3 family in this malware image.
all the layers. Furthermore as seen in our third experiment,
we removed smaller-sized images due to the skewness of
the file size distribution. The above issues motivate us to
consider a convex combination of training from scratch and
transfer learning, where transfer learning is utilized on the
high-resolution images and training from scratch is applied
on the low-resolution images. The formulation of such convex
combination is as follows:
maximize
α,β
F(αM1 + βM2)
subject to α+ β = 1.
The function F is a pre-specified evaluation metric such as
accuracy, true positive rate, F1 score, area under the curve or
the negative of false positive rate. Our preliminary experiment
shows that convex combination scheme outperforms transfer
learning or training from scratch alone. It reduces the false
positive rate by 4.2 times while increasing the accuracy by
0.3%. We plan to conduct thorough investigation for the
convex combination of transfer learning and learning from
scratch for enhanced static malware analysis.
B. Trust Score for Image-based Malware Detector
We will continue the study of interpretability and explain-
ability of deep learning models for image-based malware
detection. We will investigate the scheme of establishing an
overall trustworthy score for the deep learning model and use
such a score for model selection for deployment in cyber-
security applications.
C. Resiliency and Adversarial Machine Learning
While our proposed method is applicable on malware with
or without obfuscation, it is worthwhile to study whether the
methodology is resilient against code obfuscation. Recent stud-
ies show that small adversarial pixel perturbations on images,
even unnoticeable to the human eyes, can lead to misclas-
sification by deep learning image classification [25][26][27].
However via adversarial training, the underlying deep learning
algorithms become more robust against adversarial samples.
We plan to study how to best employ adversarial perturbation
on natural images to malware images and utilize adversarial
training to create strong defense.
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